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THE SCHOLAR WARRIOR: VISUALIZING THE
KALEIDOSCOPE THAT IS ENTITY LIABILITY,
NEGOTIATING THE TERRAIN AND FINDING
A NEW PARADIGM
Clifford S. Zimmerman*
Skill is the essence of the Scholar Warrior. Such a person strives to
develop a wide variety of talents to a degree greater than even a
specialist in a particular field. Poet and boxer. Doctor and swords-
man. Musician and knight.1
The civil rights lawyer who pursues a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 19832
against a public entity must epitomize the Scholar Warrior, deftly bal-
ancing an ever splintering and multiplying framework of what consti-
tutes public entity liability with the tact, fervor, and energy found in
only the greatest of strategists and fighters. Two points in any discus-
sion of municipal liability or Monel 3 claims, better termed local public
entity claims,4 are beyond dispute at this stage. First, there are mani-
fold problems with Monell and its progeny. Second, the Supreme
Court has increased its interest in addressing this issue in a way other
than tinkering with minor aspects as each case is decided.
Our Symposium presenters support each of these conclusions, as
well as the need for a new direction in this area to effectuate the goals
of the statute. This Essay/Commentary will unify the five presenta-
tions with the Scholar Warrior theme while exploring the future direc-
tion of public entity liability such that systemic problems are
addressed and true reform can be attained.
* Senior Legal Writing Instructor, DePaul University College of Law. © 1999 Clifford S.
Zimmerman, all rights reserved. Many thanks to the DePaul Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this Symposium. My strongest appreciation and thanks extend to Jennifer Jendusa
and Kevin Vodak for their excellent research, editing, and footnote work.
1. DENG MING-DAo, SCHOLAR WARRIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TAO IN EVERYDAY
LIFE 10 (1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
3. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4. Although such claims are typically dubbed "municipal liability" claims, technically the
claims can be brought against any public entity, including municipalities, counties, park districts,
and school boards. Thus, while many claims are against municipalities, the term is too narrow to
accurately reflect the true potential institutional targets.
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I. THE SCHOLAR WARRIOR AND LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY CLAIMS
Local public entity claims are brought essentially for one of two
reasons: either to pursue a deep pocket that can actually pay the dam-
ages awarded to the plaintiff for a violation of constitutional rights5 or
to place responsibility for the violation of a constitutional right where
it truly belongs and achieve a correction or change in the institutional
entity. Both of these are wholly justifiable and defensible given the
statute's "three main aims" as articulated by Justice Douglas in
Monroe v. Pape,6 to override certain state laws, to provide a federal
remedy not provided by state law, and to provide a remedy "where
the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice."7
While the aims of the great statute embody both reasons, the cor-
rection of institutional or systemic problems requires proportionally
greater consideration and attention as compensation can be addressed
through more straightforward means.8 Further, the controlling law in
this area should not impose limitations on local public entity claims
because of fiscal concerns when those same limitations will seriously
undermine the statute's utility to correct a systemic problem. When
the public entity either created the policy that led to the violation,
employed an individual policymaker who created the policy, knew or
should have known of the unconstitutional practice due to its repeated
occurrence, or failed to bring the particular department's practices up
to an acceptable level of functioning (i.e., failure to train, discipline,
etc.), 9 then effecting systemic change will better society as a whole
and, hopefully, reduce the number of instances leading to suits for
individual compensation.
As entity liability stands now, only a Scholar Warrior can survive
the contortions and convolutions inherent in the current state of the
law. In accord with Professor Beermann, the Scholar Warrior has to
be an historian of the law, uncovering, evaluating, and reinterpreting
5. The pursuit of the deep pocket can, itself, be for a variety of reasons, including to avoid
juror sympathies that will unjustifiably curtail an award against an individual officer or to avoid
the harsh outcome of no award where only the individual defendant is sued and the court grants
the defendant qualified immunity.
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. Id. at 173-74.
8. Here, indemnification statutes and insurance also guarantee that damages are paid. See,
e.g., Symposium, Constitutionality of Indemnification Legislation, 9 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 31
(1994); Peter Cassat, Comment, Statutory Indemnification In Section 1983 Actions Based On
Police Misconduct: Choosing A Forum, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 605. To the extent that Monell claims
are made to increase monetary relief beyond that which is appropriate, such situations do not
merit a place in this discussion.
9. These are the four basic forms of Monell claims.
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the Court's "underdeveloped analysis of [§ 1983's] text and legislative
history" in light of the common law background of the statute and
more recent common law developments. 10 Moreover, the Scholar
Warrior has to "continually construct ingenious theories for holding
municipalities responsible for the conduct of municipal employees."11
Thus, the Scholar Warrior must have extensive knowledge and under-
standing that is free of any time period limitation and intensely
creative.
Professor Gerhardt's analysis reveals that the Scholar Warrior must
have the greatest of insights and foresights. First, akin to Professor
Beermann, Professor Gerhardt suggests that the Scholar Warrior ex-
tend and apply basic analysis to include innovative theories, such as
institutional analysis, to direct and redirect the Court's interpretations
of § 1983 and varieties of constitutional law.t2 Further, he aptly points
out that the Scholar Warrior must have the insight to know, as well as
the flexibility to follow, when the Court is going to apply an individual
mindset requirement on a public entity, when tort analysis will prevail,
and when the Court will take another approach. 13 Quite appropri-
ately, then, Professor Gerhardt describes an ever-changing three di-
mensional minefield for the Scholar Warrior to negotiate, never
knowing if one step will be her last or will transport her into another
dimension of analysis. 14 The Scholar Warrior must be deft of balance,
flexible and adaptable.
Professor Blum agrees that the Scholar Warrior has to engage, un-
wind and apply the "highly complex body of interpretive law" in order
to bring (let alone prevail in) a Monell claim.15 Using high speed
chases as an exemplar, the Scholar Warrior must be keen to under-
stand not just nuance and conflict in the law, between the circuits and
within the Court's determinations, but also true confusion to which
the Court itself appears blind or ignorant. 16 The Scholar Warrior must
be part visionary.
10. Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
627, 627, 629-40 (1999).
11. Id.
12. Michael J. Gerhardt, Institutional Analysis of Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 669, 670, 677-85 (1999).
13. Id. at 671-76.
14. Id. (noting the immense difference between the terrain as defined by Monell and the cur-
rent lay of the land).
15. Karen M. Blum, Municipal Liability: Derivative or Direct? Statutory or Constitutional?
Distinguishing the Canton Case from the Collins Case, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 687, 687 (1999) (quot-
ing Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416-17 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 688-95 (comparing direct and derivative liability).
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In addition to these impediments, the Scholar Warrior must be
ready for a judge who, as Judge Hamilton states, thinks "Monell
claims should be litigated and tried less often. T17 While every civil
rights lawyer must evaluate her case to the utmost degree possible,
this may not adequately prepare the case for the new roadblocks that
may arise in the form of "institutional biases-or perhaps 'predisposi-
tions"' including the assumption that the pleadings are weak, that the
"claims should have little practical significance" in most cases, and
that the judge may desire to have only the best of Scholar Warriors
appear to litigate the claims. 18 Underlying these assumptions, Judge
Hamilton asserts that the primary motivations for Monell claims lie in
financial gain and not in societal change; thus indemnification, bifur-
cation, and issue preclusion will be essential judicial tools toward
maintaining judicial control over Monell.19 Here, the Scholar Warrior
must be a master tactician and strategist.
Mr. Taylor brings our focus squarely to § 1983 suits that are aimed
to change an ill-advised, ill-conceived, or ill-managed public entity de-
sign that is detrimental to the civil and constitutional rights of the civic
population and society as a whole.20 By definition, a systemic prob-
lem is one that the system is incapable or unwilling to acknowledge
and/or rectify. Only a court order will commence the process of
change.2' Here, the Scholar Warrior valiantly defends the weaker and
unrepresented in society while the entire system of the public entity is
brought to bear on the litigation.22 The attitudes of the defendants
and their lawyers necessitate the depth and persistence of discovery
17. Hon. David F. Hamilton, The Importance and Overuse of Policy and Custom Claims: A
View from One Trench, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 723 (1999).
18. Id. at 727, 729.
19. Id. at 729, 737.
20. G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator's View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and
Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 748-49 (1999).
21. Some assert that if the compensatory damage award or a series of such awards are signifi-
cant enough, then the local public entity will start the process of change internally. This ap-
proach, however, presumes that local public entities make decisions by adequately considering
such fiscal concerns and risks, that segments of local government all have equal bargaining
power in this process and that such awards will not be seen, simply, as the cost of doing business.
Using law enforcement as one example, this local constituency wields a great deal of power
within local government and outside as well. The popular culture's perceptions of law enforce-
ment and the ease with which changes in police rules and practices can be deemed politically
sensitive or "pro-crime" changes this balance dramatically and neutralizes any potential influ-
ence of this financial impact approach.
22. Here, the simplest example is Mr. Taylor's own dealing with the torture of alleged police
killers. Taylor, supra note 20, at 759-63. Absent representation of the alleged and convicted
police killers, how else would the subject of police torture of suspects even get raised, let alone
be addressed?
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tools that result in full battlefield engagement.23 As with all war, the
tolls are high in expenses, time, and landscape, the battles are many,
the observers scrutinize every strategy and tactic constantly changing
their assessments of its correctness, and the participants grow weary in
strength but ever stronger in their disdain for the opponent.2 4 Critical
here is that the patterns of police torture and police domestic violence
utilized by Mr. Taylor are not localized or isolated by any means.25
At the current pace of splintering in entity liability law,2 6 the
Scholar Warrior may not survive much longer. Thus, reform is neces-
sary now. Most cases involve law enforcement, and the systemic
problems in law enforcement nationwide are monumental and grow-
ing. Problems exist in the failure to properly and adequately hire and
screen,27 train, 28 monitor, supervise, counsel, and discipline. 29 Fur-
ther, the law enforcement "Code of Silence" serves not only to make a
mockery of the criminal justice system,30 but also serves as a barrier to
internal law enforcement review and reform such that officers with
multiple offenses remain in the system and their continued presence
sustains the Code.31 Finally, persistent issues of race, sex, and
homophobia-based actions by law enforcement undermine any belief
23. Id. at 749; see, e.g., Steve Mills, Attorney Wants Police Documents on Brutality Charges
Made Public, Cui. TRIB., Mar. 24,1999, § 2, at 2 (noting "city attorneys had not yet seen Taylor's
motion but would likely oppose it").
24. Taylor, supra note 20, at 749; see Richard K. Neumann Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 299 (1990).
25. Mr. Taylor references two cases arising in the Chicago area. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6
F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (torture); Czajkowski v. City of Chicago, 810 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (domestic violence). Both types of cases can be found around the country. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. City of New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding the firing of police officer
for breaking code of silence by blowing whistle on police torture of suspects in killing of police
officer); see also MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDuCr: LAW & LITIGATION § 4:20
(collecting cases on inadequate hiring); id. § 4:21 (collecting cases on inadequate training); id.
§ 4:22 (collecting cases on inadequate supervision and discipline).
26. Seemingly, every term since Monell was decided, the Court has added to the kaleidoscope
of local public entity liability. See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997);
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1997); Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397 (1997); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507
U.S. 163 (1993); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992); Will v. Michigan Dep't.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988);
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796
(1986); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
27. See AVERY ET AL., supra note 25, § 4:21.
28. See id. § 4:20.
29. See id. § 4:22.
30. See id. § 11:17.
31. See id. § 4:22.
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that law enforcement serves society.32 These problems have risen be-
yond the level of one bad apple, one bad precinct, or one bad city such
that international human rights organizations have noticed, investi-
gated, and reported findings that align law enforcement conduct in
this country with that of some of the worst human rights offenders
world-wide. 33
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH MONELL AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE
Justice Stevens has repeatedly called for the abandonment of Mo-
nell and its progeny in favor of respondeat superior liability for public
entities. 34 Three additional Justices on the Court have now added
their voices to Justice Stevens' in a broader call for a reexamination of
the Monel legacy.35 Obviously, with five other votes remaining on
the Court, any change, even imminent, could come in a variety of
forms. Even before this Symposium, the calls for Monell reform have
been frequent, formidable, and varied. 36 These suggestions or poten-
32. On law enforcement and homophobia, see Carla M. da Luz, A Legal and Social Compari-
son of Heterosexual and Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition
and Response, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 251, 268 (1994) and James D. Wilets, Inter-
national Human Rights Law & Sexual Orientation, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 41
(1994). On law enforcement and racism, see William J. Stuntz, Race, Class And Drugs, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1842 n.6 (1998) (citations omitted) and William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossi-
bility, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1213, 1220 nn.20-21 (1998). On law enforcement ind sexism, see
Sabrina Turner, Book Review, Breaking & Entering: Women Cops Talk About Life In The Ulti-
mate Men's Club, 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 175, 177 (1996).
33. AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, POLICE BRUTALITY AND EXCESSIVE
FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (1996); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1998). The Human Rights Watch report is just short of 400 pages (without appendices) and
covers 14 cities ranging from New York to Providence. The Summary and Recommendations
are alone 24 pages in length covering police and prosecutors, local, state, and national govern-
ment and include 63 specific recommendations for systemic reform. Id. at 11-24.
34. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835-40 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416-39 (1987) (Breyer, J., dissenting,
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter).
36. See Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 76-101 (1989); Steven Stein Cushman, Municipal Liability
Under Section 1983: Toward a New Definition of Municipal Policymaker, 34 B.C. L. REV. 693,
723-29 (1993) (offering alternative construct on policymaker); Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes,
Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REV.
249, 294-301; Harold S. Lewis & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 755, 829-50 (1992) (arguing for respondeat superior); Susanah Mead, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517,
538-42 (1987) (same); Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons
From Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753 (1989) (arguing for respondeat
superior); Barbara Rook Snyder, The Final Authority Analysis: A Unified Approach to Munici-
pal Liability Under Section 1983, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 633, 646-76 (offering alternative construct on
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tial outcomes can be categorized as retrograde (a return to only Mo-
nell or Monroe), tinkering (some change to the current state of the
law), and abandonment (utilizing some tool other than Monell to en-
sure public entity liability).
The retrograde approach would eliminate recovery against local
public entities or limit such recovery to a finite number of situations.
Moneil only supported public entity liability with a "policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated
by that body's officers" or a "governmental custom ... so permanent
and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of
law."' 37 In a society where government officials know better than to
formalize or reduce such decisions to a form that could be discovered
in a paper trail, the likelihood of written policies is very limited. It is
also uncertain how the Court would determine "custom or usage"
under such a more limited perspective. 38 While the current the stan-
dard allows litigation against egregious systemic harms, the potential
exists that such systemic harms could be further sheltered from review
and correction through litigation. Under this approach, the Scholar
Warrior would be even more challenged in attempting to eradicate
systemic problems.
Tinkering, perhaps more aptly labeled warping, has led to the cur-
rent state of the law. In addition to the difficulties in this approach
apparent from the presentations by Professors Beermann, Gerhardt,
and Blum, several other problem areas exemplify the future of this
path. Although § 1983 was enacted because state and local lawmakers
and law enforcement officials were not enforcing laws or not enforcing
them fairly,39 a state can now convert local officials into state officials
and effectively eliminate local public entity liability for their actions.40
In addition, the hunt to determine who is a local policymaker must
pass through state law.41 This elevation of state law to its current level
of importance is antithetical to the critical, original purpose of § 1983
policymaker); Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility For Constitutional Torts, 85
MICH. L. REV. 225, 234-48, 254-57 (1986).
37. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
38. There is a range of definitions on this. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, A Monell Update-
Clarity, Conflict and Complications, in 5 SECTION 1983 CIvIL RiGHTs LITIGATION AND A-rOR-
NEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 55, 60-61 (1989).
39. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement Of Civil Rights During The First
Reconstruction, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155, 158-69 (1995); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolution-
ary Constitutionalism In The Era Of The Civil War And Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863,
874-84 (1986).
40. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 783-96 (1997).
41. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion);
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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to override actions taken "under color of" state law that led to consti-
tutional violations, as opposed to looking for state law approval for
those actions prior to a determination of liability.42 The Scholar War-
rior has slogged through this field, but may not be able to withstand
all the future permutations. 43
One can surmise from the presentations that our Symposium par-
ticipants favor abandonment of Monell, though not necessarily for the
same reasons. 44 According to Professor Beermann, the current state
of the law is an incorrect interpretation of the legislative history and
the historical context of the passage of § 1983. 45 In his presentation,
fairness, judicial efficiency, avoiding needless complications, and the
original purpose of the statute all countenance implementation of re-
spondeat superior instead.46 Professor Gerhardt agrees that the cur-
rent state is not fair and does not adequately hold an institution
responsible where it did not act maliciously but, nevertheless, caused
the harm due to its structure, decisionmaking, or gaps in rules or com-
munication.47 Finally, Mr. Taylor ardently supports respondeat supe-
rior.48 How the Scholar Warrior will fare under this last possibility
requires greater attention.
III. THE NEED FOR RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR "PLUS"
Any new paradigm for § 1983 must further the original aims, as ar-
ticulated in Monroe, and be a viable tool to address and rectify sys-
temic problems. Section 1983 must provide a meaningful, attainable
and effective remedy for civil rights violations that emanate from a
42. McMillian, 365 U.S. at 184-87; see Steven L. Winter, The Meaning Of "Under Color Of'
Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 404-07 (1992).
43. My limited presentation here has not even touched upon the problems faced by the
Scholar Warrior from the standpoint of federalism, state of mind, causation, and qualified immu-
nity issues. See, e.g., PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION
1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 658-60, 713-15 (1994) (collecting articles on abstention); Alan K.
Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and The Role of Facts in Consti-
tutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (1997) (discussing qualified immunity and collect-
ing other articles); Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining
Responsibility in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 423-40
(1992) (same); Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to Be Subjected": The Role of Causation in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1198-1227 (1988) (discussing
causation); Barbara Kritchevsky, Return to Owen: Depersonalizing Section 1983 Municipal Lia-
bility Litigation, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1381, 1387-1415 (1996) (discussing state of mind).
44. While Professor Blum's presentation, to some extent, looks for resolution or hope in the
Court's reworking of its doctrine, her aim here was more on practicalities of the current state
than alternative approaches. Blum, supra note 15, at 688.
45. Beermann, supra note 10, at 665-68.
46. Id.
47. Gerhardt, supra note 12, at 685-86.
48. Taylor, supra note 20, at 771-72.
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local public entity. Two other considerations bear mention and are
easily incorporated. Local public entities would seek some accounting
for the variety of their natures. Further, the courts would manage
best with a simple test, particularly one that can be applied without
the potential for reinventing Monell and its progeny.
Can respondeat superior alone accomplish all of these goals and
address all of these interests? Certainly, respondeat superior is gener-
ally consistent with the aims of the statute.49 Further, in tort litigation,
it has proven quite consistent with local public entities of all sizes,
shapes, structures, and locations, regardless of decision-makers, finan-
cial liquidity, or other concerns that have arisen in § 1983 litigation. 0
Respondeat superior has been a workable judicial tool as well.51 If
there is a shortfall in this test, it is only that it addresses some, but not
all, of § 1983's concerns.
Civil rights enforcement needs strength, thus and any doctrine used
to achieve this goal must, likewise, have "teeth." Respondeat superior
needs such "teeth." Past decisions of the Court have eviscerated the
Scholar Warrior's ability to use § 1983 to effect systemic change by
dramatically limiting standing52 and eliminating aspects of injunctive
relief.53 Only with the return of these tools can the Scholar Warrior
effectively address systemic problems that cause constitutional
violations. 54
49. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 10, at 644, 651; Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 36, at 829-50.
50. Here, municipalities have all of the usual tort defenses, i.e. frolic and detour, to deal with
situations that would not otherwise have been traceable to the public entity. See, e.g., STUART
M. SPENISER ET AL, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 4:13-4:20, 17:51 (1988) (outlining the
variety of issues that can be raised by the defendant to respondeat liability).
51. There is no comparable body of articles or opinions criticizing the blossoming cottage
litigation, interlocutory appeals, or vexing complications in tort law. Many of the rulings that
alter the framework of tort litigation impact in exactly the same way in civil rights litigation. For
instance, the recent machinations of Federal Rules of Evidence 702, affect both types of cases
insofar as they utilize experts. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 1999 WL 152455 (S. Ct. Mar.
23, 1999) (examining the requirements for expert witnesses and their testimony and concluding
"that Daubert's general holding-setting forth the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obliga-
tion-applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based
on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge"). Thus, tort law does not seem to suffer from
the same evolutionary forces as civil rights law. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
52. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding an African-American man has
no standing to challenge systemic use of chokeholds against African-American men stopped by
Los Angeles police due to an inability to assert a likelihood of recurrence).
53. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (overturning injunction requiring city to draft com-
prehensive police plan for handling misconduct complaints due to limited number of complaints
and police involved).
54. Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring The Dark Matter Of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census
Of The 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 501 n.172 (1997) ("Unfortunately, since [Rizzo
and Lyons] the obstacle of finding a plaintiff who is currently subject to the challenged practice
has proved an almost insurmountable barrier to prospective relief in most police cases.");
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However, only limited avenues exist by which the adoption of re-
spondeat superior and the return of meaningful injunctive relief can
be had. The Court's history does not predict swift, broad, or effective
judicial change in favor of § 1983 becoming a tool for addressing sys-
temic problems. Likewise, the path of economic force, that is ob-
taining monetary judgments and waiting for the municipality to
change its policy as a result, has been tried and failed to lead to effec-
tive resolution.55 Thus, court decisions leave local public entities se-
cure in believing that, in many instances, change is unnecessary and,
when necessary, only reactive measures are sufficient.
In its study of the institutional nature of police brutality in this
country, Human Rights Watch reached several recommendations for
changes in the legal paradigm.56 These changes include a greater fed-
eral government presence and role in investigation and prosecution of
police brutality.57 The federal-level recommendations include chang-
ing legal standards, increasing funding to the Civil Rights Division of
the Justice Department and legislation implementing the several inter-
national agreements, making torture (no matter who commits the act)
a federal crime, and conditioning federal law enforcement money on
adequate and independent civilian oversight and review commis-
sions. 58 The state-level recommendations include the creation of state
offices dedicated to prosecuting police officials who skirt the law, state
oversight and investigatory units, and independent local investigatory
units with the power of subpoena.59
Critical to this success is requiring institutional change in a proac-
tive, as opposed to reactive, manner. Thus, local public entities should
be required to, and rewarded for, reviews, the implementation of
Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing The Constitutional In Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 661, 671 (1997)("Standing and proof problems could be insurmountable barriers
even if suit were brought in a location where official lawlessness was widespread and targeted at
a specific population."); see Richard H. Fallon Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, And Public Law
Litigation: Notes On The Jurisprudence Of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 13-74 (1984); Linda E.
Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability Of Injunctive Relief In Section 1983 Actions, 18 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 1085, 1086-1117 (1987); Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an
Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453,
1504-28 (1993); Michael J. Schmidtberger, No Holds Barred In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons:
Standing To Seek Injunctions In Federal Court Against Municipalities, 15 COLuM. HuM. R-is. L.
REV. 183, 192-205 (1984); Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 802-07 (1993).
55. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
56. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 10-24 (providing summary of
recommendations).
57. Id. at 11-12, 14-15, 20-23.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 12-14.
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change, and the weeding out of bad actors. 60 These systemic changes
should be conceived and implemented to remove obstacles to justice
and to obtain and maintain public accountability and transparency or
visibility.61 While many law enforcement organizations have advo-
cated the adoption of new or national standards for policing after
Supreme Court decisions or without the force necessary for national
adoption,62 perhaps these groups will find greater foresight and recep-
tion when positive change is linked with federal financial assistance or
other rewards.
This necessitates considerable dedication and effort from Congress
and the executive branch. Recently, Congress did enact legislation
permitting the Department of Justice to obtain injunctive relief
against local public entities for systemic problems.63 The power of this
new statute is evidenced by the Consent Decree entered between the
City of Pittsburgh and the Department of Justice in 1997.64 The ex-
tension of this statute to private individuals would effectively overrule
Rizzo and Lyons and add the "teeth" needed to address systemic
problems. When combined with the Human Rights Watch recommen-
dations, the Scholar Warrior will have the tools necessary and worthy
of her task.
CONCLUSION
The Scholar Warrior symbolizes both what is right and what is
wrong with the current Court interpretation of § 1983. She represents
the litigator who can succeed under the current construct of law and
60. Id. at 14-20.
61. Id. at 21-24.
62. See, e.g., Samuel Walker & Lori Fridell, Forces of Change in Police Policy: The Impact of
Tennessee v. Garner, 11 Am. J. OF POLICE 97, 101 (1992).
63. The text of the statute is as follows:
(a) Unlawful conduct
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person
acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of
conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental
agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration
of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro-
tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(b) Civil action by Attorney General
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of
paragraph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United
States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to elimi-
nate the pattern or practice.
42 U.S.C. § 14,141 (1994).
64. See G. Flint Taylor, U.S. Government Obtains Pittsburgh Consen't Decree, 5 POLICE MIs-
CONDUCr & CIVIL RTS. LAW REP. 114 (1997).
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the one who will be most likely to survive any future derivations. She
also stands for the limited nature of those who can effectively utilize
§ 1983 and the problem with the statute being out of reach for many
litigators who have equally valid claims addressing local public entity
actions.
The substitution of respondeat superior for Monell and its progeny
is a huge step in the right direction. However, if § 1983 is to be the
tool in the civil rights litigator's arsenal for addressing, attacking, and
changing systemic problems in local public entities, then any change
must include not only respondeat superior, but also the ability to ob-
tain injunctive relief.
The Scholar Warrior represents a key image in this field as one
looks to the future application of § 1983. The Scholar Warrior repre-
sents balance, "a cohesive approach, organized through the dualities
of mental and physical, quiescent and active, refined and coarse" that
reflects an equilibrium. 65 This balance is good for the civil rights liti-
gator and the benefits would extend to the legal system and society in
which she works.
65. DENG, supra note 1, at 5.
[Vol. 48:773
